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Abstract-Secure multicast communication is important for both
wired and wireless applications. For groups with frequent join or
depart requests, a distributed architecture that partitions the
group members into several areas is preferred. Inside each area,
scalable algorithms such as Logical Key Hierarchy (LKII) can be
used to update the group key. However, these algorithms do not
consider mobile members traveling in a Mobile Network as a
whole. In this paper, we proposed two group key management
schemes, which treat mobile members traveling in a Mobile
Network as a whole. Both schemes try to reduce the
communication costs when the Mobile Network moves in or out
of the area. Simulation results show significant reduction in
communications costs even for small number of mobile members
in the Mobile Network.
Keywords-group key management; secure multicast; network
mobility
1. INTRODUCTION
IP multicast enables efficient group communication by
allowing the sender to transmit a single copy of data, with
network elements such as routers and switches making copies
as necessary for the receivers. This solves the scalability issues
at the sender side and allows better utilization of network
resources such as bandwidth and buffer space. IP multicast not
just benefits wired network applications [2] such as pay-per-
view and multi-party games., wireless applications [3-5] such
as group-oriented mobile commerce, distance education and
intelligent transportation systems gain significant boost from it.
In order for IP multicast to scale to virtually any group size,
it relies on a single group address to identify the set of
recipients rather than explicitly listing them. However, this
anonymous receiver model prevents the content provider from
charging the members. The only way to provide controlled
access to data is to encrypt the multicast communication with a
group key and distribute this shared group key to all authorized
members [6-18]. Generally, applications might need
confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation
[6]. If membership is dynamic, this shared group key has to be
updated and redistributed to all authorized members securely
every time whenever there is a change in the membership in
order to provide forward and backward secrecy. Forward
secrecy means a departing member cannot obtain information
about future group communication and backward secrecy
means that a joining member cannot obtain information about
past group communication. Even if there is no change in the
group membership, the group key might need to be refreshed
after it has been in use for a given amount of time to thwart
cryptanalysis.
In a typical multicast key management scheme, a trusted
entity, known as the group controller (GC), is responsible for
generating, distributing and replacing the group key for a
multicast session. The operation for changing the key whenever
there is a change in group membership is known as rekeying
and rekeying cost denotes the total number of unicast or
multicast messages that needs to disseminate to the members
dufing rekeying. In order to minimize the rekeying costs f'or
large group, the GC makes use of auxiliary keys, known as key
encryption keys (KEKs), to update the group key. One popular
technique is to employ a hierarchy of keys [9-13], in which
each member is being assigned a set of keys based on its
location in the key tree.
When the number of group members becomes large, group
key management can become a significant overhead and a
potential system overhead [18]. Thus, scalable approaches
towards group key management [19-20] are needed. These
approaches achieve scalability by partitioning the group
members into a number of smaller areas to distribute the
processing workload. The partition of the group members into
areas may be done on either a physical or logical basis.
In wireless networks, mobility adds another dimension of
complexity to the design of key management scheme by
allowing members not only to join or depart the group but also
transfer between areas [16, 18, 21, 22].
In this paper, we propose two group key management
schemes for rekeying mobile members in a Mobile Network. A
Mobile Network is a leaf network, which includes one or more
mobile routers used to provide connectivity to the Internet 123,
24]. Typical examples are passengers traveling in train using
their laptop wireless LAN cards to connect to wireless LAN
access points deployed in the train. Existing algorithms do not
consider mobile members in a Mobile Network as a whole,
therefore resulting in a waste of network resources and
computation power at both the members and GC side when a
Mobile Network moves in or out of the area. In addition, out-
of-sync problem between the multicast data and the keys [25]
might occur because the interval between each joining
members might be very small when a Mobile Network moves
into an area. It is also very inefficient since the first set ofnew
keys is actually not used and is immediately replaced by the
second set ofnew keys. Similar problem occurs when a Mobile
Network moves off from the area. The remaining of this paper
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is structured as follows. Section II provides the background
material of Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) and group key
management architecture. Constraints and assumption are
covered in this section too. In Section IlI, we describe our two
group key management schemes. We present our analytical
comparison and simulation results in Section IV and V
respectively. Finally, we list our conclusion in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH)
For a a balanced key tree [9, 10, 13] with outdegree, k, the
GC stores all (kN - 1)1(k - 1) keys while each member needs to
store log k N + I keys, where N is the total number of group
members. A key tree is considered balanced when the
difference between any two member nodes to the root is not
more than one [26]. For example, in Figure 1, member Ul
knows keys KI, K2 and K5 while member U7 knows keys Kl,
K4 and KI 1. In this example, KI is the Traffic Encryption Key
(TEK) which is used to encrypt the multicast data, K2 to K4
are the Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) for rekeying purposes
and KS to K13 are the individual keys associated with the
group members on the leaf nodes.
When a member is removed from the group, the GC must
change all the keys in the path from this member's leafnode to
the root to achieve forward secrecy. All the other group
members that remain in the multicast group must update their
keys accordingly, namely change the keys in the intersection
between the path from their leaf nodes to the root and the path
from the removed member's leafnode to the root. In particular,
this means that every remaining member will leam the new
TEK. The rekeying cost is k log kN - I keys when the key tree
is balanced. For example, suppose member U9 is departing, all
the keys he stores (Kl and K4), except his individual key K13,
must be changed. The GC needs to encrypt the new K4, K4',
with KI I and K12 for U7 and U8. Then it encrypt Kl'with K2,
K3 and K4' for all group members.
If backward secrecy is required, then a join operation is
similar to a remove operafion in which the keys that the joining
member receives must be different fiom the keys previously
used in the group. When the key tree is balanced, the rekeying
cost is 2109 kN keys. Suppose member U9 is joining the group,
the GC first encrypts K4' with K4 for U7 and U8. Then it
encrypts Kl' with KI for Ul to U8. Finally, it encrypts KI' and
K4' with the individual key ofU9 for U9.
B. Group key ManagementArchitecture
Although the rekeying cost in LKH increases linearly with
logarithm of the group size for a join or depart request,
significant communication costs can be introduced if the group
size is large with frequent join or depart requests. Furthermore,
it suffers from "1 affect NA" problem [15], where action of one
member, i.e. join or depart request, affects all the other group
members.
One approach to achieve scalability is to partition the group
members into a number of smaller areas to distribute the
processing workload [19, 20]. Figure 2 illustrates the group key
management architecture; all members belong to a domain,
denoted by the collection of cells, managed by a Domain
Group Controller (DGC). The domain is divided into several
areas, each managed by an Area Group Controller (AGC)
within it. We partition the members on physical basis; therefore
the member movement within an area does not require any
rekeying. Rekeying is only needed when a member transfers
between areas, joins or departs in one area.
During the multicast session, the DGC is responsible for
generating the group key and distributes it to all AGCs. Each
AGC can use any scalable algonrthms such as LKH to
distribute the group key to the members. It is important to note
that the root of the key tree is now become a KEK as well. In
order not to overload the DGC, the registration and
deregistration of the members are carred out by the AGC too.
C. Constraints andAssumption
In this work, we focus on strict security. This means no
member can decrypt the multicast data unless he/she is
currently a member of the multicast group. Specifically, the
following constraints are enforced:
* Backward Secrecy: When a member joins the
multicast group, the group key must be changed to
ensure that the new member cannot decode any
previously transmitted multicast data.
* Forward Secrecy: When a member departs the
multicast group, the group key must be changed to
ensure that the departing member cannot decode
future data transmissions.
For both backward and forward secrecy, the group key
algorithm must halt the multicast data transmission until all the
remaining members receive the group key securely. There are
several assumptions we have made:
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Figure 1. Logical key tree
Figure 2. Group key management architecture
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* Reliable Delivery of rekeying messages: We assume
that all rekeying messages are reliably received by the
group members.
* Group Membership Policy Decisions: We assume that
the GCs possess sufficient information to determine
which members are allowed to participate.
lII. NETWORK MOBILUTY REKEYING SCHEMES
In order to reduce network resources and computation
powers needed by the AGC and group members in one area
when a Mobile Network moves in or out ofan area, we propose
two group key management schemes which treat the mobile
members in a Mobile Network as a whole. Both schemes can
adopt any scalable key tree algorithms such as LKH. Our
schemes are different from those proposed in [16, 18, 21, 22,
27] because we are more interested in mobility over large area.
A. Delayed Network Mobility Rekeying Scheme (DNARS)
In our first scheme, Delayed Network Mobility Rekeying
Scheme (DNMRS), we delay the rekeying operation by a short
interval when a mobile member transfers between areas while
still maintaining both forward and backward secrecy. In
addition, we also partition the group members into two key
trees, one for static members and one for mobile members. By
separating them, we can minimize the computation powers at
the static member side when a mobile member joins or departs
the area and via versa.
When a static or mobile member wishes to join or depart
the multicast group, the AGC in the area, AGCi, will rekey the
group immediately as described in section II. In addition, the
AGCi will inform the DGC about it and the DGC will generate
a new group key and multicast it to all the AGC. In situations
where a mobile member transfers between areas, the mobile
member will initiate a transfer by notifying the AGC in the old
area, AGCi, and the AGC in the new area, AGCj. Both AGCi
and AGCj do not perform rekeying immediately; instead they
wait for a short interval before rekeying the group in their area.
This is because if the mobile members are traveling in a Mobile
Network, all the mobile members will start to de-register with
AGCi and register with AGCj when the Mobile Network is
going to move into a new area. The interval between eachjoining or departing request is usually very short. It is
important to note that delaying the rekeying in both areas does
not affect the latency in the multicast data. This is because
there is no change in the group membership, which means that
the group key does not need to be changed. In other words, the
DGC does not need to be notified.
If we assume that the mobile member is trusted within the
multicast group, then the AGCi does not need to perform
rekeying when a mobile member transfers from one area to
another. Instead, the AGCi keeps a list of the mobile member
that performs such transfer. This list is cleared whenever the
AGCi performs a rekeying. Allowing a mobile member to have
more than one set of valid keys while he/she stays in the
multicast group does not compromise the requirement stated in
Section II, as long as all the keys he/she possesses are updated
when he/she finally departs from the multicast group. DNMRS
is different compared to batch rekeying [25, 27, 28], which
trade-off security for performance, because the AGC will only
delay rekeying if the mobile member is transferring between
areas. Furthermore, we like to emphasize that batch rekeying
does not fuilfil our requirement.
As there might be several Mobile Networks in an area,
additional information needed by the AGCi is the default router
of the mobile members. This allows AGCi to place all mobile
members in the mobile network together to minimize the
rekeying costs if LKH is used. As shown in Figure 3, Sl to S8
are the static members and MI to M6 are the mobile members.
In the mobile member key tree, the AGCi groups the members
in same Mobile Network together. In this case, assume Mobile
Network 1 moves out from the area, no rekeying is needed
since K16 is not needed anymore. However, if the related
mobile members are not properly placed together, rekeying
might be needed.
B. Mobile Group Controller Scheme(MGCS)
For our second scheme, Mobile Group Controller Scheme
(MGCS), we introduce another trusted entity, known as Mobile
Group Controller (MGC). A MGC is deployed on the Mobile
Network and it plays a similar role as an AGC. The main
difference between them is a MGC is mobile. In this case, the
registration and de-registration of the mobile members in the
Mobile Network are handled by the MGC. As for the static
members and individual mobile members, they will register or
de-register with the AGC in the area. Unlike DNMRS and
other existing algorithms, a mobile member only needs to
register and de-register once with the MGC as long as he/she
stays inside the Mobile Network. Transferring between areas
does not require the mobile members in the Mobile Network to
de-register with the AGCi and re-register with the AGCj.
In MGCS, the MGC can receive the group key either from
the DGC or the AGC in that area. Since it is possible for the
Mobile Network to experience loss of service during
movement therefore it is preferably for the MGC to obtain the
group key from the AGC in that area. In addition, the MGC
should confirm with the present AGC that the group key has
not been changed when the Mobile Network moves into a new
area. Compared with existing schemes, this scheme reduces the
latency needed for rekeying to almost none since there is no
change in the group membership. Furthermore, no computation
is needed by the AGC and the group members as there is no
change in the group membership when a Mobile Network
moves in or out of an area.
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Figure 3. Key tree for static and mobile members
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IV. ANALYTICAL COMPARISON
In this section, we focus on three performance metrics: (i)
group member key storage, (ii) GC key storage and (iii)
rekeying costs for the various join and depart request in one
area. For simplicity, we adopt LKH in our two schemes but the
other scalable algorithms will yield similar performance too.
We assume that there is only one Mobile Network in the area,
with a total number of Mmobile members and the total number
of static members is ND.
Table I examines the key storage needed by the AGC,
MGC and group members. Generally, all three AGCs have
similar key storage. The only difference is that the MGCS
requires another trusted entity, MGC, to handle the mobile
members in the Mobile Network.. As for the group members,
both static and mobile members in LKH have similar key
storage as they are placed in a single key tree. In the case of
DNMRS and MGCS, the static members and the mobile
members are in separate key tree, which leads to different key
stomge between them. This is advantageous for mobile
members as mobile members might have limited storage.
Table II examines the rekeying costs for the various join or
depart event. It can be seen that both static and mobile
members in LKH have similar rekeying costs for each
individual event as they are placed in the same key tree. As for
TABLE I. KEY STORAGE FOR AGC, MGC AND GROUP MEMBERS
LKH DNMRS MGCS
Key storage for AGC k(No + M) - I k(No + M) -2 kNo -I
+ +1 +1
k-i k-i k-I
Key storage for static member Flogk (No + M)1 +2 Flogk N0 +2 [lOgs N01 +2
Key storage for mobile member Flog, (No + M)1 + 2 Dlog, M + 2 Fiog, MI + 2
kM-i
+1
Key storage for MGC - k-I
TABLE 1I. REKEYING COSTS FOR GROUP MEMBERS FOR VARIOUS JOIN OR DEPART EVENT
LKH DNMRS MGCS
Rekeying costs for 2Flog, (N0 +M)1+1i 2Fiog, N 1+1i 2[log, N0 1+1|
Static member static member
joins the area Rekeying costs for 2F1og,, (N. + M)1 1 I 1
mobile member
Rekeying costs for kFlog, (No + M)I kFlog, No 1 kFlog, No 1
Static member static member
departs the area Rekeying costs for k[iogk (N. + M)1 1 1
mobile member
Rekeying costs for M
Mobile Network static member =2Flogk (No + m)1
moves into Rekeying costs for M k(M- 1)
the area mobile member 2Flogk (N, +m)l k -1)
kI
Rekeying costs for M
MobileNetwork | static member |
moves out of Rekeying costs for M
tthe area | mobile member IZ kFlogk (N0 + i)1 -I |
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DNMRS and MGCS, the static and mobile members are placed
on separate key trees, therefore the join or depart request of a
static member does not affect the key tree of the mobile
members. Regardless ofwhether the Mobile Network moves in
or out of an area, the static and mobile members in MGCS do
not need any rekeying if there is no change in the group
membership. In the case of LKH, when the Mobile Network
moves in or out of an area, the rekeyiig costs can overwhelm
the AGC and the static members as each mobile member starts
to de-register with the old AGC and register with the new
AGC. This is because LKH did not anticipate the mobile
members in the Mobile Network, therefore it performs a
rekeying each time a mobile member joins or departs the area,
resulting in a waste of network resources and computation
power.
V. COMPARISON USING SUMULATION
In this section, we use simulation to get a better
understanding on the rekeying costs for the static and mobile
members when the Mobile Network moves in and out of the
area. The worst case is assumed although the result might be
better. For our simulation, we use a balanced binary key tree
(k12). There are a total of 8192 static members in the area and
we vary the total number of mobile members in the Mobile
Network from I to 200. Similarly as in section IV, we assume
that there is only one Mobile Network in the area.
Figure 4 shows the rekeying costs for the static and mobile
members when the Mobile Network moves into the area. We
can see that the rekeying cost for static and mobile members in
LKH is very high compared to DNMRS and MGCS. This is
because it did not consider mobile members in Mobile Network
as a whole. In our simulation, we assume that the mobile
members register and de-register within the waiting period in
the DNMRS. If the mobile members in the Mobile Network
register outside the waiting period, the rekeying costs will be
slightly higher than the one shown below. The static members
in DNMRS do not need any rekeying since there is no change
in group membership. As for the mobile members in DNMRS,
the rekeying cost consists of the cost to create a new key tree.
In the case ofMGCS, no rekeying is needed for both the static
and mobile members when the Mobile Network moves into an
area since there is no change in the group membership.
Figure 5 shows the rekeying costs for the static and mobile
members when the Mobile Network moves out of the area.
Similarly, LKH incurs huge rekeying costs due to the lack of
anticipation of the mobile members in the Mobile Network. A
rekeying is performed every time a mobile member de-registers
with the old AGC. As for DNMRS and MGCS, rekeying is not
needed. This is because the mobile members are placed on
separate key tree; therefore the key tree of the static members is
not affected when the mobile members transfer to another area.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented two group key management
schemes, which consider mobile members in Mobile Network
as a whole. Doing so can reduce the rekeying costs by a
significant amount when the Mobile Network moves in or out
of the area compared to existing algorithms. Proper placement
Perfornance evaluaon when a Mobile Network moves Iioths area
NutnOer or mobie members tnrrer of mobie rrernber
Figure 4. Rekeying costs when a Mobile Network moves into the area
Performance evaluation when a Mobil Network rnoves out ofthe area
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Figure 5. Rekeyig costs when a Mobile Network moves out ofthe area
of the mobile members in the key tree is also taken into
consideration in order to minimize the rekeying costs.
The first scheme, DNMRS, delays the rekeying operation
when a mobile wishes to transfer between areas. In addition,
the group members are partitioned into two key trees: one for
static members and one for mobile members. This approach
has several advantages. First, the key storage of the mobile
members is minimized and this benefits mobile devices with
limited storage. Second, the join or depart event of a static
member does not affect the mobile members and similarly thejoin and depart event of the mobile member does not affect the
static members since both of them are placed on separate key
tree. This benefits those mobile devices with limited
computation power. Reducing the number of decryptions can
also help to conserve energy which leads to battery saving.
Third, even though the AGC needs to wait for a short time
period, which is sufficient long enough for all mobile members
in the Mobile Network to send their registration or de-
registration when the Mobile Network moves in or out of the
area, it does not affect the latency in the multicast data since the
multicast data is not halted.
The second scheme, MGCS, introduces another trusted
entity, MGC, which is responsible for all the mobile members
in the Mobile Network. All mobile members in the Mobile
Network need to register or de-register with the MGC only
once when they want to join or depart from the multicast
session. Similarly as the DNMRS, the joining and departing of
a static member does not affect the mobile members. As long
as there is no change in the group membership, no rekeying
cost is incurred during the movement. Compared to DNMRS,
this approach is better since the mobile members do not need to
720
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de-register with the old AGC and register with the new AGC
when the Mobile Network moves from one area to another.
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